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Objectives: This study characterises risk-taking behaviours in a group of people with a self-
reported diagnosis of BD using Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT). FTT hypothesises that risk-taking 
is a “reasoned” (but sometimes faulty) action, rather than an impulsive act associated with 
mood fluctuations.   
Design: We tested whether measures of FTT (verbatim and gist-based thinking) were 
predictive of risk-taking intentions in BD, after controlling for mood and impulsivity. We 
hypothesised that FTT scales would be significant predictors of risk-taking intentions even 
after accounting for mood and impulsivity. 
Methods: 58 participants with BD (age range 21 to 78, 68% female), completed a series of 
online questionnaires assessing risk-intentions, mood, impulsivity and FTT.   
Results: FTT scales significantly predicted risk-taking intentions (medium effect sizes), after 
controlling for mood and impulsivity consistent with FTT (part range .26 to .49). Participants 
with BD did not show any statistically significant tendency towards verbatim-based thinking. 
Conclusions: FTT gist and verbatim representations were both independent predictors of 
risk-taking intentions, even after controlling for mood and impulsivity. The results offer an 
innovative conceptualisation of the mechanisms behind risk-taking in BD. 
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Practitioner Points: 
 Risk-taking behaviour in bipolar disorder is not just a consequence of impulsivity 
 Measures of fuzzy trace theory help to understand risk-taking in bipolar disorder 
 FTT measures predict risk-taking intentions, after controlling for mood and 
impulsivity 
 




Decision Making and Risk in Bipolar Disorder: A quantitative study using Fuzzy Trace 
Theory 
 
People diagnosed with bipolar disorder (BD), a condition predominantly characterised 
by a difficulty in emotion regulation and impairments in cognitive processing (Phillips, 
Ladouceur and Drevets, 2008), are particularly prone to risk-taking behaviours (Chandler et 
al., 2009). These behaviours can manifest in severe forms such as substance use and alcohol 
abuse, crimes, sexual promiscuity and unwise financial activities (Fazel, Lichtenstein, Grann, 
Goodwin, and Långström, 2010; Kopeykina et al., 2016; McIntyre et al., 2007; Wilens et al., 
2004) with serious consequences at the individual and societal levels (Dalton, Cate-Carter, 
Mundo, Parikh, and Kennedy, 2003; Meade, Graff, Griffin and Weiss, 2008).  
Psychological models have explored how these behaviours develop in BD, in 
particular exploring the role of factors such as impulsivity and manic type experiences 
(Holmes et al., 2009; Johnson, 2005). Nonetheless, conceptualising risk-taking behaviours as 
simply the result of mood states and/or impulsivity can limits our understanding of more 
complex psychological processes that have been found to guide these behaviours in a range 
of clinical and non-clinical populations. 
Fuzzy Trace Theory (FTT) (Brainerd and Kingma, 1984; Brainerd and Reyna, 1992), 
offers a new conceptualisation of the mechanisms behind risk-taking behaviours that could be 
relevant for BD, because rather than understanding risk taking as a function of impulsivity, 
mood, or arousal, FTT frames risk taking as the result of a “reasoned” (but sometimes faulty) 
process, with potential practical clinical implications.  
FTT is a theory of memory processing, which posits that when people are exposed to 
a meaningful stimulus in their daily lives, they encode their memories of those experiences 
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using a temporally parallel, dual-processing method, in the form of both verbatim and gist 
representations (Reyna, 2008, 2004; Reyna and Rivers, 2008).   
Verbatim representations are recorded as similarly as possible to the original 
experience, (i.e., it is literal, or in other words, verbatim). These representations are more 
difficult to remember accurately and may thus also be altered by post-stimulus emotions in a 
given situation. Conversely, a gist representation is more qualitative and captures what the 
person perceives as the “bottom line” meaning of the information recorded. Gist 
representations are often subjective, and can be influenced by several factors including the 
person’s emotional state at the time of the stimulus, educational or cultural background and 
their developmental stage (e.g., adulthood vs adolescence) (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995).  
Some other models propose similar mechanisms of memory as FTT. The dual 
representation model juxtaposes two ways of encoding memories: conscious, voluntary, 
verbally accessible memories (VAMs) with high potential for alteration over time, and 
unconscious, emotional, situationally accessible memories (SAMs), focused on meaning 
making or judgment (Brewin, Dagleish and Joseph, 1996). These components resemble 
verbatim and gist respectively. Despite the parallels and merits, this model is ultimately 
situated in Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder research, and does not broach decision-making or 
risk in its scope. A theory that allows an integration of memory processing theories, decision-
making, and risk could serve as particularly useful in investigating a risk-taking population 
such as those with BD.  
 FTT fills this gap by demonstrating how memories and analytical thinking, as 
opposed to intuitive thinking, can lead to risk-taking behaviours. When a risk-taking decision 
is presented, FTT states that the individual retrieves either gist or verbatim memories to make 
an informed decision, and that this retrieval is impacted by their mental processes and other 
environmental factors or cues (such as age, emotions, and other stimuli).  
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According to FTT, analytical (verbatim) thinking is considered faulty due to its 
disregard of the bottom-line (gist) meaning of the information presented. Verbatim-based 
thinking leads to an overestimation of the benefits or an underestimation of the risks of a 
decision. For example, in deciding whether to begin smoking or not, being told that smoking 
accounts for 30% of all cancer-related deaths may lead an individual to believe that 30% is 
not a lot, compared to the other 70%. Though precise and analytical, this type of belief 
demonstrates a “reasoned route” to risk-taking (Reyna, 2004; Reyna and Brainerd, 1995). 
Comparatively, the knowledge that, overall, smoking is dangerous for one’s health, is 
ultimately a less risky observation. In this way, though counter-intuitive, an over-reliance on 
precise, verbatim-based thinking rather than fuzzy, gist-based thinking increases the 
likelihood of making a risky decision (e.g., starting to smoke, or engaging in unsafe sex). 
Indeed, studies completed in the field of FTT (Reyna, Weldon and McCormick, 2015; Rivers, 
Reyna and Mills, 2008) have found a correlation between verbatim-based thinking and higher 
risk-taking intentions, a relationship that has been replicated in further research on FTT. 
Furthermore, the careful, analytical trade-off of risks and benefits often used to alter 
particular behaviours (e.g. to continue to gamble or not), may create insight that is not easily 
transferable into subtly different decisions. This inability to transfer insight has been 
hypothesised as responsible for the fade-out effect of clinical risk prevention interventions, 
routinely based on the assumption that teaching clients to carry out a careful trade-off of risks 
and benefits will decrease risk-taking (Reyna and Mills, 2014). According to FTT, the 
method of trading-off risks and benefits will not yield transferrable effects, but gist thinking 
may.  
 Instead of conceptualising decisions on risk-taking as impulsive versus thoughtful 
actions, FTT juxtaposes “deliberate” action based on faulty verbatim thinking with a more 
intuitive, gist-based approach, with the latter being linked to lower risk-taking (Reyna, 2004).  
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FTT and emotion 
 FTT’s focus on the role of emotions in decision-making is a perspective of value 
considering BD. As a disorder characterised by risk-taking and emotional highs and lows, 
clarifying how emotions impact on decision-making processes will be beneficial to further 
enhance targeted psychological interventions for this population.  
FTT carefully distinguishes between emotion and intuition, a distinction that appears 
unique in memory theories (Rivers et al., 2008). According to FTT, not all kinds of emotions 
are synonymous with poor decision-making. Valence, the simple evaluation of a stimulus as 
“good or bad” based on an intuitive “gut feeling”, is a key aspect of emotion, and considered 
a necessary component of gist. This renders valence ultimately helpful (and not harmful) in 
decision-making processes (Chick and Reyna, 2012). Nonetheless, valence is determined and 
influenced in part by experience. Therefore, adults, who have acquired the necessary 
experience to trigger a negative “gut feeling”, will avoid a risky situation, such as 
unprotected sex. However, younger populations, such as adolescents, lack this experience and 
thus, might have acquired a “faulty valenced conception” that unprotected sex is fun. In the 
absence of accurate experiential information, adolescents may (accurately) perceive the 
situation (unprotected sex) as positive in the short-term, given the immediate rewards of sex, 
underestimating the long term negative consequences of unprotected sex (e.g. unwanted 
pregnancies, STIs, HIV). This underestimation of risk may change subsequently when the 
adolescent experiences the negative consequences of these kinds of actions (e.g. sexually 
transmitted diseases; Rivers, Reyna and Mills, 2008). 
Emotional arousal and intense emotions may also create what researchers define as 
“false memories” for the gist of an experience (Corson and Verrier, 2007; Kaplan, Van 
Damme, Levine and Loftus, 2015). The bottom-line meaning (gist) of the situation is 
recorded based on the emotion felt at the time of the experience. This can potentially create a 
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“pre-loaded” response to future risky situations that trigger similar feelings to the original 
event. For instance, if an individual experiences intense fear when they see a fight in a bar, 
this will cue them to be risk-averse; thus, if fear is re-triggered during similar sub-sequent 
events, a risk-aversive rather than a risk-seeking response is triggered, even if the sub-sequent 
event might not pose the same risk as the original event. Alternatively, if anger is the 
dominant emotion upon seeing a fight in a bar, risk-taking rather than risk-aversion is the 
likely response in subsequent events (see Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Reyna and Landa, 2015; 
Rivers et al., 2008).  
Of course, FTT is not the only memory theory that investigates the ways in which 
emotional elements may interact with memory formation. The Interacting Cognitive 
Subsystems model proposes a multilevel processing system with many interacting 
components, including propositional elements, responsible for the sensory aspects of 
memories (verbatim), and implicational components, which contribute to the “holistic”, 
emotional contagion of memories (a valence, or gist; Barnard and Teasdale, 1991). This 
system, however, does not propose parallel processing of memories, a key component of 
FTT, and again, does not explicitly address risk-taking.  
The unique interpretation of emotion as a factor in decision-making and gist 
processing, leading to underestimation of risk in the formation of gist memories, makes FTT 
a theory of particular interest in BD. 
 Fuzzy Trace Theory and Bipolar Disorder 
 Elevated rates of risk-taking behaviours remain a significant clinical challenge in 
mental health services targeting people diagnosed with BD. Research on risk-taking 
behaviours in BD has been overwhelmingly characterised by a focus on impulsivity as a 
driver of risk-taking. Nonetheless, as outlined above, FTT posits that impulsivity might not 
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be the only driver to risk-taking and proposes a more “reasoned” route to understand risk-
taking behaviours in clinical and non-clinical populations.  
 Emotion (in the form of valence and arousal) has been found to influence parallel 
processes in FTT in different ways.  Emotion is both a crucial and a detrimental factor in 
decision-making processes. If emotional arousal has been found to contribute to “false 
memories” for the gist of experiences and pre-loaded responses for subsequent decisions, it 
can be hypothesised that in BD, which is characterised by a difficulty in regulating emotions, 
and thus, the experience of regular intense emotional states (Phillips, Ladouceur and Drevets, 
2008), similar processes might be at play in prevalent risk-taking behaviours. Of particular 
relevance to this claim are risk-taking behaviours during manic states. It is understood in 
research and clinical practice that people with BD tend to experience positive feelings of 
euphoria and a sense of achievement when taking risks during manic episodes. As outlined 
above, positive feeling states tend to lead to more risk-taking behaviours to enhance the 
positive feeling, a circumstance described in cognitive models of BD as ascent behaviours 
(Mansell et al., 2007).  
 Research in FTT has found a greater influence of emotion on verbatim-based retrieval 
(Rivers et al., 2008). Intuitively, an overreliance on verbatim-based thinking in the presence 
of intense emotions would lead to increased risk-taking, a link that has been widely observed 
in FTT research on adolescent populations (Chick and Reyna, 2012). 
 Clarifying how people with BD engage in verbatim-based and gist-based thinking, 
could offer valuable insight into the risk-taking processes in this population.   
  There is emerging evidence supporting interventions informed by FTT in risk 
reduction programs for adolescents (Reyna et al., 2015b), health-related issues such as 
obesity (Brust-Renck et al., 2016), and CBT for psychosis (Landa, 2012; Landa et al., 2015). 
If FTT successfully explains and reduces risk in these populations and domains, it could be 
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effective in individuals with BD as well. In individuals with BD, an intervention of this kind, 
with a cognitive-behavioral approach targeting gist formation and retrieval, could lead to 
similar improvements in risk reduction and improve long-term efficacy of programs.  
 
The current study 
Studies of decision-making in clinical populations are valuable, because they help 
clarify the mechanisms behind negative outcomes and point towards the development of 
potential new treatments. By characterising BD using FTT, we aim not only to use a novel 
framework to conceptualise decision-making and risk-taking behaviours in BD, but offer 
potential clinical recommendations to improve treatments and outcomes in BD.  
FTT is also of interest given the developmental timeline it posits. Studies on FTT 
have found that there is usually a shift from verbatim-based thinking to gist-based thinking 
during adolescence (Reyna and Mills, 2014). It is documented that the onset of BD is before 
the age of 21 (e.g. Ferrari et al., 2016; Grande, Berk, Birmaher and Vieta, 2016; Goldstein et 
al., 2017) and clinical precursors to BD have been observed in adolescence (Duffy, Alda, 
Crowford, Milin, and Grof, 2007; Duffy, Alda, Hajek, Sherry and Grof, 2010; Duffy et al., 
2014). With the cognitive changes observed during the prodromal stages of BD 
(Lewandowski, Cohen and Öngur, 2011) these factors could impact the natural 
developmental conversion between verbatim and gist-based thinking in people diagnosed 
with BD. 
The current study aimed to take the first step in considering FTT as a factor in risk 
and decision-making in BD, and characterise a group of people with a self-reported diagnosis 
of BD utilising this novel theory.  
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To achieve this aim: a) we described the patterns of response of the sample to FTT 
measures (i.e. gist and verbatim scales), and b) we explored whether FTT scales continued to 
predict risk-taking intentions after accounting for mood state and impulsivity.   
We hypothesised that FTT scales would be significant predictors of risk-taking 
intentions even after accounting for mood and impulsivity. 
Materials and Methods 
Participants were recruited from social media (Twitter), UK and international charities, 
and client support organisations. Inclusion criteria required participants to be over the age of 
18, fluent English speakers, able to provide informed consent and have a self-reported 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder. 
Measures 
 Data were collected through anonymised online questionnaires using Qualtrics 
software (2005), Version 3.5.0, Copyright © [2017].   
Demographic and clinical characteristics 
Several demographic and clinical variables were collected through a questionnaire 
developed for this study. We asked participants about their gender, date of birth, employment 
and marital status, education level, ethnic background and native language. The questions 
were in multiple-choice format with the option of an “other” category, where participants 
could enter an alternative response. 
Participants were asked about time of diagnosis, diagnosis type, number of episodes, 
current psychological interventions, and current medication. There was also a question about 
when the participants believed their problems with mania/depression started, since it has been 
observed that there can be a significant delay between onset of symptoms and diagnosis of 
BD (Grande, Berk, Birmaher and Vieta, 2016). 
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Participants were also asked whether they believed they were currently experiencing 
an episode of mania/depression or both and when this started, and when their last episode of 
mania/depression terminated. 
Information about comorbid mental health diagnoses and medical conditions 
(including HIV/AIDS) was also collected. The HIV/AIDS questions were included to ensure 
the applicability of the FTT questionnaires to all participants, as the content of the questions 
assesses gist and verbatim based on sexual risk taking concerning the hypothetical possibility 
of contracting a sexually transmitted disease or becoming pregnant. Participants who 
indicated that they had a diagnosis of HIV/AIDS were directed to an alert informing them 
that the content of some of the questionnaires may not be applicable and they were asked to 
respond to the questions about HIV/AIDS in a hypothetical manner, i.e. as if they did not 
already have HIV/AIDS. Of the total number of participants, only one indicated a positive 
diagnosis for HIV/AIDS.  
Fuzzy Trace Theory Scales  
The theoretical structure of FTT necessitates the conceptualisation of gist and 
verbatim through the use of a specific topic. The FTT scales, developed by Mills, Reyna and 
Estrada (2008), focused on adolescent sexual risk taking. The context of sexual risk taking 
was kept for this study, to remain as close to the original questionnaires as possible, and due 
to the relevance of sexual risk taking concerning individuals with a diagnosis of BD 
(Chandler et al., 2009).  
Verbatim scales. Two verbatim scales were used for the current study. The first scale, 
a Specific-Risk scale, comprised five items that listed concrete consequences of risky sexual 
behaviour (e.g., contracting HIV or sexually transmitted diseases) and asked participants to 
estimate the personal risk of those consequences on a 5-point scale ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. These items were designed to trigger verbatim memories of past 
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behaviours (e.g., instances where the person engaged in unprotected sex), thus involving a 
verbatim (or analytic) mode of thinking. The scale showed excellent reliability in our sample 
(α=.96). A second verbatim scale, the Quantitative Risk Scale, was used to check the validity 
of the other scale, and asked participants to quantify their risk of having an STD based on 
their actual sexual behaviour on a scale from 0 to 100. Higher scores on the specific risk and 
quantitative risk scales indicate higher endorsement of verbatim principles. 
 Gist scales. Three gist scales were used to measure gist-based thinking (Mills et al., 
2008). The Categorical Risk Scale comprised of nine items that measured categorical 
thinking about risk (e.g., “even low risks happen to someone”), and were rated on a 5-point 
scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". High scores on the categorical risk 
scale indicate higher categorical thinking about risk. The scale showed acceptable reliability 
(α=.79). The Gist Principles Scale contained 15 simple statements about risk (e.g., “avoid 
risk”), and participants were asked to indicate which statements applied to them (or not). 
High scores on the gist principles scale indicate lack of endorsement of gist principles. The 
scale showed good reliability in our sample (α=.80). The final gist scale, Global Risk, asked 
participants to state in a single item their personal risk of having sex as “low”, “medium” or 
“high”. Higher scores on the global risk question indicate higher personal risk perception. 
Measurement of mood 
Participants’ lifetime history of manic symptoms was evaluated using the Mood 
Disorder Questionnaire (MDQ; Hirschfeld et al., 2000), and more time-sensitive alterations 
in mood were assessed with the 7up 7down inventory (Youngstrom et al., 2013). The MDQ 
is a self-report questionnaire comprising 13 symptom items and 2 items about clustering and 
severity of impact, which was developed as a screening tool for BD. Participants are asked to 
answer "yes" or " no" to a series of questions about lifetime symptoms of mania and 
hypomania and subsequently indicate the degree of impairment caused by these symptoms. 
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Higher scores in the MDQ indicate a higher number of lifetime symptoms and degree of 
impairment. The typical cut-off for a positive diagnosis using the MDQ is 7 out of 13. The 
MDQ showed acceptable reliability in our sample (α=.71). 
The 7up 7down inventory is a measure derived from the General Behaviour Inventory 
(GBI). It comprises seven items asking about symptoms of mania (7up) and seven items 
asking about depressive symptoms (7down). Participants are asked to state how often they 
have experienced each symptom during the past two weeks and score each item as "never or 
hardly ever", "sometimes", "often", "very often" or "almost constantly" (scored 0 to 3). 
Higher scores in the 7up are indicative of mania, whilst higher scores in the 7down scale 
indicate a possible depressive state. Both the 7up (α=.93) and 7down (α=.96) scales showed 
excellent reliability in our sample.  
Measurement of impulsivity 
 Impulsivity was measured using the simplified version of the Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale (BIS-11; Spinella, 2007). The BIS-11 is a widely used measure of impulsiveness and 
comprises 14 items scored on a 4-point scale of "rarely/never", "occasionally", "often" and 
"almost always/always" (scored 1 to 4).  Higher scores in the BIS-11 are indicative of higher 
impulsivity. The scale showed excellent reliability (α=.90) in our sample.  
Measurement of risk-taking intentions 
Information about participants’ risk-taking intentions was collected using the Domain 
Specific Risk Taking Scale for Adult Population (DOSPERT; Blais and Weber, 2006). The 
DOSPERT encompasses two scales measuring risk taking behaviour (RT) and risk perception 
(RP).  Each scale comprises 30 items. We used the RT subscale in the current study, which 
uses a 7-point scale from “extremely unlikely” to “extremely likely” (scored 1 to 7) and asks 
the participants to score their likelihood to engage in each stated behaviour or activity. Higher 
scores in the RT subscale indicate higher risk-taking intentions. The DOSPERT_RT scale is 
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comprised of five further subscales evaluating risk-taking intentions in different domains: 
ethical (α=.65), financial (α=.77), health/safety (α=.72), recreational (α=.86) and social 
(α=.77). A further subscale about sexual-risk intentions (α=.62) was generated for the current 
study based on items 9 (“having an affair with a married man/woman”) and 15 (“engaging in 
unprotected sex”) to reflect the focus on sexual activity of the FTT scales. 
Data Analyses 
Data were analysed using SPSS version 22.0. We conducted descriptive and 
frequency analyses. We evaluated participants’ response patterns on the gist and verbatim 
scales via exploratory analyses, using measures of central tendency and graphical visual 
inspections to characterise BD in terms of endorsement of gist and verbatim principles. 
Finally, we ran hierarchical regression models to explore whether FTT scales predicted risk-
taking intentions after controlling for mood and impulsivity. Considering the exploratory 
nature of this study, we did not conduct multiple test corrections. 
Ethical Statement 
The current study was approved by the Faculty of Health and Medicine Research Ethics 
Committee (FHMREC) at XXXXXXX. 
Results 
Demographic and clinical variables 
One hundred and ten participants accessed the online link to the study survey, of 
whom 78 (71%) began the survey and 58 (53%) fully completed the survey and were 
included for analyses. No significant differences were observed between the final sample and 
the 20 participants who did not complete the study, but provided demographic information, 
on age (t(76)=-1.55, p=.12), gender (x2(2)=3.50, p=.17), or education level (x2(1)=3.46, 
p=.06). An acceptable amount of data at the item level was missing for the participants 
included in the analyses. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the final sample are 
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presented in Table 1. Fifty-three participants (91%) obtained a positive screening on the 
MDQ (cut score > 7).   
FTT Scales  
The responses on verbatim scales (Specific Risk and Quantitative Risk scales) showed 
a trend towards low scores (Specific Risk: M=7.10, SD=4.08, range=5 to 25; Quantitative 
Risk: M=.97, SD=2.16, range=0 to 10), which, in accordance to the literature on FTT, 
indicates lack of endorsement of verbatim principles in this sample.  
 Regarding measures of gist, 77% scored ‘low’, 18% scored ‘medium’ and 5% scored 
‘high’ on the Global Risk Question, indicating a general low perception of personal risk of 
having sex. Scores on both the Categorical Risk (M=24.78, SD=5.89, range=4 to 36) and Gist 
Principles Scales (M=20.93, SD=3.20, range=15 to 28) showed the widest range of responses 
in possible scores observed among the FTT scales.  
Significant correlations between individual FTT scales range from rs = .53 to rs = -.27 
(Table 2). Two participants were found to be outliers on the Specific Risk Scale, and were 
removed from correlation analyses when the Specific Risk Scale was used. 
 When predicting intentions to engage in risk-taking related with sex, both the Gist 
Principles Scale and the Specific Risk Scale (Verbatim) made significant contributions 
explaining variance, after controlling for mood (part=.31 and part=.22). The (hypo)manic 
scale (7up) also made a significant contribution (part=.27) to this model (Table 3, panel A). 
Regarding the direction of the effects, participant’s endorsement of verbatim, non-
endorsement of gist representations and presence of hypomanic symptoms were associated 
with higher risk-taking intentions in the sexual domain. The pattern of results was similar 
when impulsivity (BIS Total Score) was added to the model, replacing mood. Impulsivity 
was no longer a significant predictor of risk-taking intentions in the sexual domain when FTT 
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scales were entered to the model. FTT scales explained 27% of variance over and above 
impulsivity (Table 3, panel B).  
 When predicting risk-taking intentions in the ethical domain, only the Gist Principles 
Scale (part=.25) and (hypo) mania (7up; part=.27) were found to be significant predictors 
(Table 4, panel A). The same pattern was observed when impulsivity was added to the model, 
replacing mood; the Gist Principles Scale predicted a significant amount of variance 
(part=.29) and impulsivity also made a significant contribution to the model (part=.42) 
(Table 4, panel B).   
 Finally, when predicting risk-taking intentions in the health/safety domains, the 
opposite pattern was observed. In this model, only the Specific Risk Scale (Verbatim) made a 
significant contribution (part=.24) instead of the Gist Principles Scale, and the depression 
scale (7down; part=.25) instead of the (hypo)mania scale (7up), significantly contributed to 
explaining variance (Table 5, panel A). In the model that included impulsivity instead of 
mood, impulsivity was the strongest predictor (part=.42), followed by the Gist Principles 
Scale (part=.24) and the Specific Risk Scale (part=.21), which almost reached significance 
(p=.05) (Table 5, panel B).  
 These models were statistically significant, with relevant predictors showing small or 
medium effect sizes in the expected direction when predicting intentions to engage in risk 
behaviours. 
Discussion 
  Overall, the findings of this study are promising. FTT can be used to characterise 
risk-taking in BD, and the FTT measures explained unique variance in risk-taking intentions 
that went beyond the effects of impulsivity and mood. Given the limitations of the study, it 
must be noted that the findings discussed are preliminary, and there is a need for replication 
and increased methodological stringency before more sturdy conclusions can be drawn. 
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However, even given the exploratory nature of this study, the authors believe that the 
deepened understanding of risk-reduction in BD using FTT could contribute to promising 
future directions for research and clinical interventions.  
Characterising BD and risk-taking with FTT measures 
 We observed varied responses in the gist scales, and lack of endorsement of gist 
representations, showing that non-endorsement of verbatim was independent of endorsement 
of gist principles. These results may reflect how verbatim and gist representations are 
encoded simultaneously, but retrieved separately, depending on the stimuli presented (Rivers 
et al., 2008). Thus, one person can have multiple, distinct, and even contradictory, 
representations of the same situation, but will rely on verbatim or gist depending on a series 
of factors (i.e., age, emotions, stimuli). The FTT scales themselves reflect the potential for 
simultaneous encoding, as the items do not strictly oppose one another in content and it is 
conceivable that a participant would endorse items on both scales. 
The associations between FTT and risk-taking were correlated in the expected 
direction. Namely, the endorsement of verbatim (although not common) was positively 
correlated with higher risk-taking intentions and the endorsement of gist principles was 
correlated with lower risk-taking intentions. These findings are partially consistent with other 
studies, which found contrasting patterns for verbatim and gist measures in relation to risk-
taking (e.g., Mills et al., 2008). However, there were no significant correlations between the 
Categorical Risk Scale (Gist) and any of the measures of risk-taking intentions.   
We also found a counterintuitive result when evaluating the association of Global 
Risk Question and risk; high scores on this scale were found to be positively correlated with 
risk-taking intentions in the sexual domain, contrary to findings reported by Mills et al., 
(2008), who found negative correlations between these variables. FTT provides a possible 
explanation: people who are more likely to take risks are prone to deny vulnerability when a 
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“global measure” is used, but may acknowledge their risks when cued to recall specific 
events in which they engaged in risk-taking behaviours. Conversely, risk-avoiders would be 
able to acknowledge their global risk of having sex but tend to score lower on measures 
asking for specific risk-taking as they have less events to recall (Reyna et al., 2015b; Reyna 
and Brainerd, 1995). In addition, demographic characteristics (age, gender) of our sample 
might have also contributed to the above result. 
Do FTT measures predict risk-taking intentions? 
The main findings of the current study indicate the unique predictive value of the 
verbatim (Specific Risk Scale) and gist scales (Gist Principles Scale) when predicting risk-
taking intentions after controlling for mood or impulsivity. Endorsement of verbatim and gist 
principles explained a statistically significant amount of variance (medium effect sizes) in 
risk-taking intentions in this sample. These results were in the expected direction (e.g. 
reliance on verbatim indicating higher risk-taking), supporting our main hypothesis that risk-
taking is not simply a result of impulsive behaviours or mood fluctuations typical of BD, but 
a combination of these and other complex processes involved in decision-making (Mills et 
al., 2008; Reyna, 2008; Reyna and Brainerd, 1991).  
One important finding is that the reasoning process triggered by stimuli related to sex 
(item content of FTT scales) was capable of predicting risk-taking intentions in other 
domains such as ethical and health/safety. This indicates that despite variations in content, the 
activation of certain cognitive patterns may impact a broader range of decisions. 
The opposing pattern of predictors and outcomes in our sample, with gist (but not 
verbatim) predicting risk-taking intentions in the ethical domain, and verbatim (but not gist) 
predicting risk-taking intentions in the health/safety domains can be explained by past 
research. Significant differences in predictors of risk-taking intentions across different 
domains of risk taking (e.g. sexual, financial, health and safety) have already been observed 
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(e.g., Blais and Weber, 2006), suggesting that the processes underlying risk-taking intentions 
in specific domains might be different. 
For example, ethical decisions have been hypothesised to be fundamentally different 
from other types of decisions, as the choices made may directly benefit or harm others 
(Crossan et al., 2013). Therefore, ethical decisions are usually based on a person’s internal 
“ethical code”, and have been found to be overwhelmingly dominated by “intuition” rather 
than “rationality” (Rand et al., 2014). Thus, in ethical decisions, individuals may rely on 
intuitive gist representations rather than verbatim, as reflected in the results of the study. 
Conversely, decisions concerning health/safety are usually based on precise 
information – e.g. risk percentages when trying to consider the lifetime prevalence of a health 
condition – and thus are more likely to cue verbatim representations when the person is faced 
with a decision (Reyna, 2008), supporting our finding that verbatim-based processes (not 
gist) predicted health/safety risk intentions. 
Replication of these results is naturally necessary to parse out subtle differences 
between predictors when explaining variance on different domains of risk-taking intentions.  
Clinical implications 
Using FFT theory, clinicians may wish to consider preventative approaches aimed at 
modifying whether the person relies on verbatim/gist representations during decision-making. 
Research on FTT has already found promising results in risk-reduction in the adolescent 
population (Reyna and Adam, 2003; Reyna and Mills, 2014). An intervention in adolescents 
using the principles of FTT was effective in reducing risky sexual behavior above and 
beyond a simple risk reduction intervention and a control group. Since values inform gist 
representations and are key to the long-lasting nature of this kind of risk prevention, the 
intervention focused on promoting extraction of bottom-line, gist meaning, automatic 
retrieval of relevant personal values and automatic application of values to gist 
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representations (Reyna and Mills, 2014). By working with patients to increase gist 
representation and recognition of bottom-line arguments pertaining to risky actions, risky 
behaviour can potentially be reduced. With the support of studies such as the current one, it 
may be possible to implement similar approaches for individuals with BD.  
Most importantly, our findings might help explain why current interventions to 
prevent risk-taking in BD are not effective for every person. In fact, risk-prevention 
interventions for BD are often based on the idea that by providing the client with detailed 
information about the risks and benefits of their behaviours, they will be more likely to avoid 
risky choices. However, we have observed how this approach, based on the idea that optimal 
decision-making is a result of a careful trade-off of risks and benefits (as reflected in 
verbatim representations), may actually cause opposite effects (i.e. more risk-taking) 
according to FTT (Mills et al., 2008; Reyna and Adam, 2003; Reyna and Farley, 2006). In 
relying on verbatim-based thinking, although people may be able to correctly recall the 
specific facts related to a situation, they may still fail to derive the bottom-line meaning of the 
situation presented to them, which is key to informed decision-making (Reyna, 2008). Thus, 
clinicians may wish to consider a new conceptualisation of risk and a re-evaluation of current 
preventative programs for people diagnosed with BD, informed by the principles of FTT. 
Limitations 
 The current study has some limitations. First, it is important to note that due to the 
online recruitment strategy, the current study might have a bias toward a group of people 
with relatively high functioning and might have missed potential participants who were 
toward the lower functioning end of the spectrum. Preliminary analyses comparing 
participants who completed the study and those who did not showed non-significant 
differences on a series of variables (e.g., age, diagnosis type, level of education). 
Nonetheless, the sample of the current study predominantly comprised of people from white 
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ethnical background and who had completed some form of higher education, which could 
have impacted on the results of the study. 
It is also important to outline that the available clinical information (including BD 
diagnosis) was self-reported; thus, there was no objective evidence to confirm diagnosis of 
BD and other clinical variables (91% obtained a positive screening on the MDQ). Future 
studies may wish to consider face-to-face methods of evaluation to overcome these 
limitations. A comparison group (non-clinical and/or non-BD) would be a valuable 
contribution to this line of research. 
 Second, due to the relatively small number of participants, the number of variables 
entered into the regression models was limited to ensure statistical power. This made it 
difficult to explore the effects of clinical and demographic variables such as age on the 
predictive value of FTT scales regarding risk-taking intentions. It would be beneficial to 
replicate this study in a larger sample size with more controls for potentially confounding 
variables.  
Third, it is important to take into account that the FTT scales used in the current study 
were specifically designed to test risk-taking intentions in an adolescent sample (see Mills et 
al., 2008). Thus, it is possible that this influenced the results in the current study, which 
involved a sample of an older age group. Further research may wish to use a scale that is 
better adapted to BD or adult populations, or recruit diverse samples of younger and older 
participants to offer potential comparisons between age group and clarify patterns of response 
in FTT measures. 
Conclusions 
 This study showed promising results in explaining the links between FTT measures 
and risk-taking intentions in BD. The main finding was that gist and verbatim representations 
are both independent predictors of risk-taking intentions, even after controlling for mood and 
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impulsivity. FTT offers a new more complex framework of the mechanisms behind risk-
taking in BD, in addition to the traditionally cited mechanisms of impulsivity and mood 
fluctuations. Ultimately, this research offers investigators new avenues to explore, clinicians 
novel conceptualizations of patient behaviour, and patients potential for relief from the 

























Adida, M., Clark, L., Pomietto, P., Kaladjian, A., Besnier, N., Azorin, J.M., Jeanningros, R., 
& Goodwin, G.M.. (2008). Lack of insight may predict impaired decision making in 
manic patients. Bipolar Disord. 10, 829–837. doi:10.1111/j.1399-5618.2008.00618.x 
Adida, M., Jollant, F., Clark, L., Besnier, N., Guillaume, S., Kaladjian, A., Mazzola-
Pomietto, P., Jeanningros, R., Goodwin, G.M., Azorin, J.-M., & Courtet, P. (2011). 
Trait-Related Decision-Making Impairment in the Three Phases of Bipolar Disorder. 
Biol. Psychiatry, 70, 357–365. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2011.01.018 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC. 
Barnard, P.J., & Teasdale, J. D. (1991). Interactive cognitive subsystems: A systemic 
approach to cognitive-affective interaction and change. Cognition and Emotion, 5(1), 
1-39. Doi: 10.1080/02699939108411021 
Blais, A.-R., & Weber, E.U. (2006). A Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) scale for 
adult populations. Judgm. Decis. Mak. 1, 33–47. 
Brainerd, C.J., & Kingma, J. (1984). Do children have to remember to reason? A fuzzy-trace 
theory of transitivity development. Dev. Rev. 4, 311–377. doi:10.1016/0273-
2297(84)90021-2 
Brainerd, C.J., & Reyna, V.F. (1992). Explaining “Memory Free” Reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 3, 
332–339. 
Brewin, C. R., Dalgleish, T., & Joseph, S. (1996). A dual representation theory of 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Psychological review, 103(4), 670. 
Buelow, M.T., & Suhr, J.A. (2009). Construct Validity of the Iowa Gambling Task. 
Neuropsychol Rev, 19, 102–114. doi:10.1007/s11065-009-9083-4 
Cameron, L.D., & Leventhal, H. (2003). The self-regulation of health and illness behavior. 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-24 
 
Routledge, New York. 
Chaiken, S., & Trope, Y. (1999). Dual-process theories in social psychology. Guildford 
Press, New York. 
Chandler, R.A., Wakeley, J., Goodwin, G.M., & Rogers, R.D. (2009). Altered risk-aversion 
and risk-seeking behavior in bipolar disorder. Biol. Psychiatry, 66, 840–6. 
doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.05.011 
Chick, C.F., & Reyna, V.F. (2012). A fuzzy trace theory of adolescent risk taking: Beyond 
self-control and sensation seeking., in: The Adolescent Brain: Learning, Reasoning, and 
Decision Making. American Psychological Association, Washington, pp. 379–428. 
doi:10.1037/13493-013 
Christakou, A., Gershman, S.J., Niv, Y., Simmons, A., Brammer, M., & Rubia, K. (2013). 
Neural and Psychological Maturation of Decision-making in Adolescence and Young 
Adulthood. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25, 1807–1823. 
doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00447 
Corson, Y., & Verrier, N. (2007). Emotions and false memories. Psychological Science, 
18(3), 208-2011. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01874.x 
Crossan, M., Mazutis, D., & Seijts, G. (2013). In search of virtue: the role of virtues, values 
and character strengths in ethical decision making. J. Bus. Ethics, 113, 567–581. 
doi:10.1007/s10551-013-1680-8 
Dalton, E.J., Cate-Carter, T.D., Mundo, E., Parikh, S.V., & Kennedy, J.L. (2003). Suicide 
risk in bipolar patients: the role of co-morbid substance use disorders. Bipolar Disorder, 
5(1), 58-61. 
Di Marzo, S., Giordano, A., Pacchiarotti, I., Colom, F., Sánchez-Moreno, J., & Vieta, E. 
(2006). The impact of the number pf episodes on the outcome of Bipolar Disorder. 
European Journal of Psychiatry, 20, 21–28. 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-25 
 
Duffy, A., Alda, M., Crowford, L., Milin, R., & Grof, P. (2007). The early manifestations of 
bipolar disorder: a longitudinal prospective study of the offspring of bipolar parents. 
Bipolar Disorders, 9, 828-838. doi: 10.1.1.665.7575 
Duffy, A., Alda, M., Hajek, T., Sherry, S.B., & Grof, P. (2010). Early stages in the 
development of bipolar disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 121(1-2), 127-135. 
doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2009.05.022 
Duffy, A., Horrocks, J., Doucette, S., Keown-Stoneman, C., McCloskey, S., & Grof, P. 
(2014). The developmental trajectory of bipolar disorder. The British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 204, 122-128. doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.113.126706 
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious. Am. 
Psychol., 49, 709–724. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.49.8.709 
Evans, J.B. (2008). Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social 
Cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol, 59, 255–78. 
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 
Fazel, S., Lichtenstein, P., Grann, M., Goodwin, G.M., & Långström, N. (2010). Bipolar 
disorder and violent crime: new evidence from population-based longitudinal studies 
and systematic review. Arch Gen Psy, 67(9), 931-938. Doi: 
10.1001/archgenpsychiatry.2010.97 
Ferrari, A.J., Stockings, E., Khoo, J-P., Erskine, H.E., Degenhardt, L., Vos, T., & Whiteford, 
H.A. (2016). The prevalence and burden of bipolar disorder: findings from the Global 
Burden of Disease Study 2013. Bipolar Disorders, 18(5), 440-450 . doi: 
10.1111/bdi.12423  
Grande, I., Berk, M., Birmaher, B, & Vieta, E. (2016). Bipolar Disorder. Lancet, 387, 1561-
1572. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(15)00241-X 
Goldstein, B. I., Birmaher, B., Carlson, G. A., DelBello, M. P., Findling, R. L., Fristad, M., . . 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-26 
 
. Youngstrom, E. A. (2017). The International Society for Bipolar Disorders Task 
Force report on pediatric bipolar disorder: Knowledge to date and directions for future 
research. Bipolar Disord, 19(7), 524-543. doi:10.1111/bdi.12556 
Hastie, R., & Park, B. (1986). The Relationship Between Memory and Judgment Depends on 
Whether the Judgment Task is Memory-Based or On-Line. Psychol. Rev., 93, 258–268. 
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.93.3.258 
Hilty, D.M., Leamon, M.H., Lim, R.F., Kelly, R.H., & Hales, R.E. (2006). A review of 
bipolar disorder in adults. Psychiatry (Edgmont, 3, 43–55. 
Hirschfeld, R.M., Williams, J.B., Spitzer, R.L., Calabrese, J.R., Flynn, L., Keck, P.E., Lewis, 
L., Mcelroy, S.L., Post, R.M., Rapport, D.J., Russell, J.M., Sachs, G.S., & Zajecka, J. 
(2000). Development and validation of a screening instrument for bipolar spectrum 
disorder: the Mood Disorder Questionnaire. American Journal of Psychiatry, 157, 1873-
5. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.157.11.1873 
Hıdıroğlu, C., Demirci Esen, Ö., Tunca, Z., Neslihan Gűrz Yalçìn, S., Lombardo, L., Glahn, 
D.C., & Özerdem, A. (2013). Can risk-taking be an endophenotype for bipolar disorder? 
A study on patients with bipolar disorder type I and their first-degree relatives. J. Int. 
Neuropsychol. Soc., 19, 474–82. doi:10.1017/S1355617713000015 
Holmes, K.M., Bearden, C.E., Barguil, M., Fonseca, M., Serap, M.E., Nery, F.G., Soares, 
J.C., Mintz, J., & Glahn, D.C. (2009). Conceptualizing impulsivity and risk taking in 
bipolar disorder: importance of history of alcohol abuse. Bipolar Disord., 11, 33–40. 
doi:10.1111/j.1399-5618.2008.00657.x 
Johnson, S.L. (2005). Mania and dysregulation in goal pursuit: a review. Clin. Psychol. Rev., 
25, 241–262. doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2004.11.002 
Kaplan, R.L., Van Damme, I., Levine, L.J., & Loftus, E.F. (2016). Emotion and false 
memory. Emotion Review, 8(1), 8-13. doi: 10.1177/1754073915601228 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-27 
 
Kleinman, L., Lowin, A., Flood, E., Gandhi, G., Edgell, E., & Revicki, D. (2003). Costs of 
Bipolar Disorder. Pharmacoeconomics, 21, 601–622. doi:10.2165/00019053-
200321090-00001 
Kopeykina, I., Kim, H.J., Khatun, T., Boland, J., Haeri, S., Cohen, L.J., & Galynker, I.I. 
(2016). Hypersexuality and couple relationships in bipolar disorder: A review. 
Journal of affective disorders, 195, 1-14. Doi: 10.1016/j.jad.2016.01.035 
Lewandowski, K.E., Cohen, B.M., & Öngur, D. (2011). Evolution of neuropsychological 
dysfunction during the course of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. Psychological 
Medicine, 41(2), 225-241. Doi: 10.1017/S0033291710001042. 
Lombardo, L.E., Bearden, C.E., Barrett, J., Brumbaugh, M.S., Pittman, B., Frangou, S., & 
Glahn, D.C. (2012). Trait impulsivity as an endophenotype for bipolar I disorder. 
Bipolar Disord., 14, 565–570. doi:10.1111/j.1399-5618.2012.01035.x 
MacDonald, L., Chapman, S., Syrett, M., Bowskill, R., & Horne, R. (2016). Improving 
medication adherence in bipolar disorder: A systematic review and meta-analysis of 30 
years of intervention trials. Joural of Affective Disorders, 194, 202–221. 
doi:10.1016/j.jad.2016.01.002 
Mansell, W., Morrison, A. P., Reid, G., Lowens, I., & Tai, S. (2007). The interpretation of, 
and responses to, changes in internal states: An integrative cognitive model of mood 
swings and bipolar disorders. Behav Cogn Psychother, 35(5), 515-539. 
doi:10.1017/S1352465807003827 
McIntyre, R. S., McElroy, S. L., Konarski, J. Z., Soczynska, J. K., Bottas, A., Castel, S., . . . 
Kennedy, S. H. (2007). Substance use disorders and overweight/obesity in bipolar I 
disorder: preliminary evidence for competing addictions. J Clin Psychiatry, 68(9), 1352-
1357. 
Meade, C. S., Graff, F. S., Griffin, M. L., & Weiss, R. D. (2008). HIV risk behavior among 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-28 
 
patients with co-occurring bipolar and substance use disorders: associations with mania 
and drug abuse. Drug Alcohol Depend, 92(1-3), 296-300. 
doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2007.07.013 Mills, B., Reyna, V.F., & Estrada, S. (2008). 
Explaining Contradictory Relations between Risk Perception and Risk Taking. Psychol. 
Sci., 19, 429–433. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02104.x 
Murphy, F.C., Rubinsztein, J.S., Michael, A., Rogers, R.D., Robbins, T.W., Paykel, E.S., & 
Sahakian, B.J. (2001). Decision-making cognition in mania and depression. Psychol. 
Med., 31, 679–93. 
National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (2014). Bipolar Disorder: Assessment and 
management. Available from: 
https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/cg185/resources/bipolar-disorder-assessment-and-
management-pdf-35109814379461   
Phillips, M. L., Ladouceur, C.D., & Drevets, W.C. (2008). A neural model of voluntary and 
automatic emotion regulation: implications for understanding the pathophysiology and 
neurodevelopment of bipolar disorder. Mol Psychiatry, 13(9), 829-857. Doi: 
10.1038/mp.2008.65 
Rand, D.G., Epstein, Z.G., Gosling, S., López-Rodríguez, L., & Jiménez, J. (2014). Risking 
Your Life without a Second Thought: Intuitive Decision-Making and Extreme Altruism. 
PLoS One, 9, e109687. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109687 
Reddy, L.F., Lee, J., Davis, M.C., Altshuler, L., Glahn, D.C., Miklowitz, D.J., & Green, M.F. 
(2014). Impulsivity and Risk Taking in Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia. 
Neuropsychopharmacology, 39, 456–463. doi:10.1038/npp.2013.218 
Reyna, V.F. (2008). A theory of medical decision making and health: fuzzy trace theory. 
Med. Decis. Making, 28, 850-65. doi:10.1177/0272989X08327066 
Reyna, V.F. (2004). How People Make Decisions That Involve Risk: A Dual-Processes 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-29 
 
Approach. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 13, 60–66. doi: 10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00275.x 
Reyna, V.F., & Adam, M.B. (2003). Fuzzy-Trace Theory, Risk Communication, and Product 
Labeling in Sexually Transmitted Diseases. Risk Anal., 23, 325–342. doi:10.1111/1539-
6924.00332 
Reyna, V.F., & Brainerd, C.J. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis. Learn. 
Individ. Differ., 7, 1–75. doi:10.1016/1041-6080(95)90031-4 
Reyna, V.F., & Brainerd, C.J. (1991). Fuzzy-trace theory and framing effects in choice: Gist 
extraction, truncation, and conversion. J. Behav. Decis. Mak., 4, 249–262. 
doi:10.1002/bdm.3960040403 
Reyna, V.F., & Farley, F. (2006). Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: 
Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy. Psychol. Sci. Public Interes., 7, 1–
44. doi: 10.1111/j.1529-1006.2006.00026.x 
Reyna, V.F., & Mills, B.A. (2014). Theoretically Motivated Interventions for Reducing 
Sexual Risk Taking in Adolescence: A Randomized Controlled Experiment Applying 
Fuzzy-Trace Theory. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen., 143, 1627–1648. doi:10.1037/a0036717 
Reyna, V.F., & Rivers, S.E. (2008). Current Theories of Risk and Rational Decision Making. 
Dev. Rev., 28, 1–11. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2008.01.002 
Reyna, V.F., Weldon, R.B., & McCormick, M. (2015). Educating Intuition: Reducing Risky 
Decisions Using Fuzzy-Trace Theory. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci., 24, 392–398. 
doi:10.1177/0963721415588081 
Rivers, S.E., Reyna, V.F., & Mills, B. (2008). Risk Taking under the Influence: A Fuzzy-
Trace Theory of Emotion in Adolescence. Dev. Rev., 28, 107–144. 
doi:10.1016/j.dr.2007.11.002 
Robinson, L.J., & Ferrier, I.N. (2006). Evolution of cognitive impairment in bipolar disorder: 
a systematic review of cross-sectional evidence. Bipolar Disord., 8, 103–116. doi: 




Rubinsztein, J.S., Michael, A., Underwood, B.R., Tempest, M., & Sahakian, B.J., (2006). 
Impaired cognition and decision-making in bipolar depression but no “affective bias” 
evident. Psychol. Med., 36, 629-639. doi:10.1017/S0033291705006689 
Saddichha, S., & Schuetz, C. (2014). Is impulsivity in remitted bipolar disorder a stable trait? 
A meta-analytic review. Compr. Psychiatry, 55, 1479–1484. 
doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2014.05.010 
Schwarz, N. (2000). Emotion, cognition, and decision making. Cogn. Emot., 14, 433–440. 
doi:10.1080/026999300402745 
Sloman, S.A. (1996). The Empirical Case for Two Systems of Reasoning. Psychol. Bull., 
119, 3–22. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.1.3 
Slovic, P., Peters, E., Finucane, M.L., & Macgregor, D.G. (2005). Affect, risk, and decision 
making. Health Psychol., 24, S35-40. doi: 10.1037/0278-6133.24.4.S35 
Spinella, M. (2007). Normative data and a short form of the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale. Int. 
J. Neurosci., 117, 359–368. doi: 10.1080/00207450600588881 
Thomas, J., Knowles, R., Tai, S., & Bentall, R.P. (2007). Response styles to depressed mood 
in bipolar affective disorder. Journal of Affective Disorders, 100, 249–52. 
doi:10.1016/j.jad.2006.10.017 
Tymula, A., Rosenberg Belmaker, L.A., Ruderman, L., Glimcher, P.W., & Levy, I. (2013). 
Like cognitive function, decision making across the life span shows profound age-
related changes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A., 110, 17143-8. 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1309909110 
Vartanian, O., Mandel, D.R., & Duncan, M. (2011). Money or life: Behavioral and neural 
context effects on choice under uncertainty. J. Neurosci. Psychol. Econ., 4, 25–36. 
doi:10.1037/a0021241 
DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-31 
 
Wilens, T. E., Biederman, J., Kwon, A., Ditterline, J., Forkner, P., Moore, H., Swezey, A., 
Snyder, L., Henin, A., Wozniak, J., & Faraone, S.Z. (2004). Risk of substance use 
disorders in adolescents with bipolar disorder. Journal of American Academy of Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry, 43 (11), 1380-1386. Doi: 
10.1097/01.chi.0000140454.89323.99 
Youngstrom, E.A., Murray, G., Johnson, S.L., & Findling, R.L. (2013). The 7 Up 7 Down 
Inventory: A 14-Item Measure of Manic and Depressive Tendencies Carved From the 
General Behavior Inventory. Psychol. Assess., 25, 1377–1383. doi:10.1037/a0033975 
Zimmerman, M., Galione, J.N., Chelminski, I., Young, D., Dalrymple, K., & Ruggero, C.J. 
(2010). Sustained unemployment in psychiatric outpatients with bipolar disorder: 
frequency and association with demographic variables and comorbid disorders. Bipolar 
























Age, Mean(SD), [Range] 49 (15), [21-78] 
Female, n (%) 39 (68) 
In employment/Students, n (%) 34 (59) 
Native English Speakers, n (%) 50 (86) 
Attended Higher Education, n (%) 
 
49 (85) 
Ethnicity, n (%)  
     White British/White Other 49 (85) 
      Asian 3 (5) 
      Mixed 1 (2) 
      Black/African/Caribbean 1 (2) 
      Other Ethnic Background 
 
4 (7) 
Time since diagnosis, n (%)  
      In the past year 3 (5) 
      In the past 2-5 years 13 (23) 
      In the past 6-10 years 15 (26) 
      In the past 11-15 years 10 (17) 
      More than 16 years ago 
 
17 (29) 
Diagnosis Type, n (%)        
      Bipolar Type I 19 (33) 
      Bipolar Type II 27 (46) 
      Bipolar NOS 11 (19) 
      Schizoaffective Disorder 1 (2) 
  
Number of BD episodes experienced, n (%) 
      Between 0-5 episodes 
      Between 6-10 episodes 
      Between 11-20 episodes 







Currently in psychological therapy, yes, n (%) 11 (19) 
      Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 2 (3) 
      Counselling 2 (3) 
      Psychotherapy 3 (5) 
      Other/Not specified 
 
4 (7) 
Currently receiving BD medication yes, n (%) 
      Combination 
      Mood Stabilizers 
      Antipsychotics 
      Antidepressants 







DECISION MAKING AND RISK IN BIPOLAR DISORDER 
2-33 
 
Currently experiencing a mood episode yes, n (%) 35 
Last mood episode more than 6 months ago, n (%) 24 
Other comorbid diagnoses yes, n (%) 23 
 
 
Table 2.  Correlations between FTT scales 
Scale CategRisk GistPrinc GlobalRisk¥ SpecRisk¥ QuantRisk¥ 
Categorical Risk - -.18 -.01 -.27* -.21 
Gist Principles -.18 - .29* .21 .35** 
Global Risk¥ -.01 .29* - .26 .29* 
Specific Risk¥ -.27* .21 .26 - .53** 
Quantitative Risk¥ -.21 .35** .29* .53** - 
Note: *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001; ; SpecRisk = Specific Risk Scale; Quant = Quantitative 
Risk Scale; CategRisk = Categorical Risk Scale; GistPrinc = Gist Principles Scale; 
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Table 3.  Hierarchical Regression model for FTT scales, mood and impulsivity predicting 
DOSPERT Sex Subscale 
Variables Panel A R2 ΔR B (SE) 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Upper 
Step1 – Intercept .29 .29*** .77 (1.44) -2.11 3.65 
7up – (hypo)mania   .29 (.08) .12 .45 
7down - Depression   .17 (.07) .03 .31 
Step 2 – Intercept .44 .16** -7.39 (2.63) -12.68 -2.10 
7up – (hypo)mania   .20 (.08) .04 .35 
7down - Depression   .09 (.07) -.04 .22 
Gist Principles   .38 (.13) .12 .64 
Specific Risk   .39 (.19) .02 .76 
Note: Overall Model - F(4, 51)=10.17, p<.001; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; 
 
Variables Panel B 
Step1 – Intercept .10 .10* 3.15 (1.61) -.08 6.39 
BIS Total Score   .13 (.05) .03 .24 
Step 2 – Intercept .37 .27*** -7.99 (2.85) -13.72 -2.27 
BIS Total Score   .07 (.05) -.02 .17 
Gist Principles   .47 (.13) .21 .73 
Specific Risk   .47 (.19) .08 .85 
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Table 4.  Hierarchical Regression model for FTT scales and mood predicting DOSPERT 
Ethical Subscale 
Variables Panel A R2 ΔR B (SE) 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Upper 
Step1 – Intercept .22 .22** 6.94 (2.82) 1.28 12.60 
7up – (hypo)mania   .52 (.16) .20 .85 
7down - Depression   .21 (.14) -.06 .48 
Step 2 – Intercept .33 .11* -5.73 (5.42) -16.61 5.15 
7up – (hypo)mania   .38 (.16) .06 .70 
7down - Depression   .08 (.13) -.19 .35 
Gist Principles   .58 (.27) .04 1.12 
Specific Risk   .67 (.38) -.10 1.43 
Note: Overall Model - F(4, 51)=6.26, p<.001; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; 
 
Variables Panel B      
Step1 – Intercept .29 .29*** 4.69 (2.69) -.71 10.08 
BIS Total Score   .42 (.09) .24 .60 
Step 2 – Intercept .42 .13** -10.20 
(5.14) 
-20.52 .12 
BIS Total Score   .34 (.09) .17 .52 
Gist Principles   .65 (.24) .17 1.12 
Specific Risk   .56 (.35) -.14 1.25 
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Table 5.  Hierarchical Regression model for FTT scales and mood predicting DOSPERT 
Health/Safety Subscale 
Variables Panel A R2 ΔR B (SE) 95% Confidence Interval 
    Lower Upper 
Step1 – Intercept .23 .23** 8.55 (3.34) 1.85 15.25 
7up – (hypo)mania   .42 (.19) .04 .80 
7down - Depression   .48 (.16) .16 .80 
Step 2 – Intercept .33 .10* -3.98 (6.47) -16.97 9.02 
7up – (hypo)mania   .26 (.19) -.12 .64 
7down - Depression   .34 (.16) .02 .67 
Gist Principles   .50 (.32) -.14 1.15 
Specific Risk   .95 (.46) .03 1.86 
Note: 1Overall Model - F(4, 51)=6.31, p<.001; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001; 
 
Variables Panel B      
Step1 – Intercept2 .29 .29*** 6.68 (3.22) .23 13.14 
BIS Total Score   .51 (.11) .29 .72 
Step 2 – Intercept .42 .13** -9.54 (6.19) -21.96 2.89 
BIS Total Score   .41 (.10) .20 .62 
Gist Principles   .65 (.28) .09 1.22 
Specific Risk   .83 (.42) -.01 1.67 
Note: Overall Model - F(3, 52)=12.43, p<.001; *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
